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A B S T R A C T
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’s recent draft guidance on automated decision-
making and profiling seeks to clarify European data protection (DP) law’s little-used right
to prevent automated decision-making, as well as the provisions around profiling more broadly,
in the run-up to the General Data Protection Regulation. In this paper, we analyse these
new guidelines in the context of recent scholarly debates and technological concerns. They
foray into the less-trodden areas of bias and non-discrimination, the significance of adver-
tising, the nature of “solely” automated decisions, impacts upon groups and the inference
of special categories of data—at times, appearing more to be making or extending rules than
to be interpreting them. At the same time, they provide only partial clarity – and perhaps
even some extra confusion – around both the much discussed “right to an explanation” and
the apparent prohibition on significant automated decisions concerning children.The Working
Party appears to feel less mandated to adjudicate in these conflicts between the recitals
and the enacting articles than to explore altogether new avenues. Nevertheless, the direc-
tions they choose to explore are particularly important ones for the future governance of
machine learning and artificial intelligence in Europe and beyond.
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Right to an explanation
Right of access
General Data Protection Regulation
1. Background
In relation to a data subject, Article 22 of the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR)1 prohibits (with exceptions) any
“decision based solely on automated processing, including pro-
filing, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or
similarly significantly affects him or her”.This right was ported
to the GDPR from the Data Protection Directive (DPD) 1995 (arts
12(a) and 15),2 and itself borrowed from early French
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2 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
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data protection (DP) law.3 The intent of the 1995 provision was
to respond to fears in the early days of digitisation that auto-
mated, and hence potentially inscrutable and unchallengeable,
decisions might prejudice access to important facilities such
as credit, housing or insurance. In practice, the provision was
little known and largely unused. However since it was mi-
grated to Article 22 of the GDPR with little substantive change,
the right has become the subject of much academic attention4
for its possible utility in curbing the power of complex, opaque
and often invisible machine learning (ML) algorithms. Such
systems commonly now make or, more often, support deci-
sions of huge citizen and consumer importance in public and
private sector domains such as criminal justice, welfare, taxa-
tion, search, marketing, entertainment and political opinion-
making. Much concern has been raised in legal, policy and
journalistic circles over whether such systems may create dis-
criminatory, biased or unfair results.5
Art 22 is not a simple article to construe, being rife with ex-
ceptions and complications.The right is excluded if the decision
is necessary for a contract, authorised by Member State law,
or based on explicit consent. If the first or third exceptions apply,
then minimum explicitly prescribed safeguards must be put
in place. Furthermore if the decision is based on “special” cat-
egories of personal data (defined in art 9 of the GDPR and
including sensitive data such as health, race and religion), then
automated decision-making is only allowed on the basis of ex-
plicit consent or substantial public interest (usually where lives
are at risk) and again, “safeguards” must be put in place. What
these “safeguards” entail has become particularly controver-
sial especially when considering if, as some have claimed,6 a
“right to an explanation” of how or why algorithmic system
made a decision is implied or explicit in the GDPR.
Art 22 is not the only part of the GDPR to have been pressed
into service to regulate the rise of algorithmic decision-
making. Information and access rights in arts 13–15, again
derived from a longstanding pedigree in the DPD but now in-
terestingly tweaked, provide for the first time that data subjects
must be informed of the very existence of automated decision-
making, including profiling, in addition to “meaningful
information about the logic involved, as well as the signifi-
cance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for
the data subject”. What this “meaningful information” might
entail, both in theory and practice, has again become a subject
of considerable enquiry.7
Against the backdrop of this renewed global interest in art
22 and other parts of the GDPR as remedies with which to
“enslave the algorithm”,8 the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party (A29WP)’s release of their draft guidance on “Auto-
mated individual decision-making and Profiling”9 has been
eagerly awaited. The document is wide ranging, and weightier
(in a literal sense, by page count) than any other GDPR guid-
ance yet published by the body. Included are the definitions
of both automated decision-making and profiling; elabora-
tions and analysis of the specific automated decision-making
provisions in Article 22; as well as the more general provi-
sions on profiling and automated decision-making elsewhere
in the GDPR. In addition, specific issues on children and data
protection impact assessments (DPIAs) are explored. Best prac-
tice recommendations and a reading list are annexed.
2. Implications for information and access
rights
In an important paper, Wachter et al. claim the information
and access rights in Section 2 of the GDPR only guarantee
general and ex ante information around algorithmic systems
rather than ex post information about how an automated de-
cision related to a particular data subject’s circumstances was
generated.10 This conclusion has been relatively controver-
sial, particularly in relation to how much ‘heavy lifting’ is done
by the new addition of the term “meaningful” in comparison
to the DPD.11
Implicitly and without fanfare, the A29WP appears to align
themselves with Wachter et al’s view, by agreeing that the arts
13–15 right to “meaningful information about the logic in-
volved” provides a “more general form of oversight”, rather than
“a right to an explanation of a particular decision” [italics
original].12 The information should consist of “simple ways to
tell the data subject about the rationale behind, or the crite-
ria relied on in reaching the decision, without necessarily always
3 Lee A Bygrave, ‘Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data
Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’ (2001) 17 Computer
Law & Security Report 17 at 17.
4 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, ‘European Union regula-
tions on algorithmic decision-making and a “right to explanation” ’
(ICML Workshop on Human Interpretability in Machine Learning
(WHI 2016), New York, NY, 2016); Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn
of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era’ in J Bus and
others (eds.) Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2012 (IOS Press, 2012);
Dimitra Kamarinou, Christopher Millard and Jatinder Singh, ‘Machine
Learning with Personal Data’ (2016) Queen Mary School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 247/2016; Sandra Wachter, Brent
Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a right to explanation of au-
tomated decision-making does not exist in the General Data
Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 76;
Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm? Why a
“Right to an Explanation” is Probably Not the Remedy You Are
Looking For’ (2017) 16 Duke Law and Technology Review 18.
5 See eg Campolo and others, AI Now 2017 Report (AI Now Insti-
tute 2017); Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate
Impact’ 104 California Law Review 671.
6 Goodman and Flaxman op. cit.
7 Edwards and Veale (n 4).
8 Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Enslaving the algorithm: From
a “right to an explanation” to a “right to better decisions” ’ (Brus-
sels Privacy Symposium, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2017). Available
on SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3052831.
9 Article 29 Working Party (A29WP), ‘Guidelines on Automated in-
dividual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of
Regulation 2016/679’ (WP 251, 3 October 2017). <https://perma.cc/
3X54-2DGC>.
10 Wachter and others op. cit.
11 See eg Andrew Selbst and Solon Barocas, ‘Regulating Inscru-
table Systems’, draft on file with authors; cf Andrew Selbst and Julia
Powles, ‘Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation’ (2017)
17 International Data Privacy Law <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3039125> accessed 10 December 2017.
12 A29WP (n 9), section 2 at 24.
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attempting a complex explanation of the algorithms used or
disclosure of the full algorithm”.13 Interestingly, earlier on (p
15) the A29WP also explicitly notes that art 15, which is trig-
gered by a data subject explicitly seeking information, implicitly
after processing has commenced, does not provide the data
subject with more information than should have been pro-
vided under arts 13 and 14—articles which require a data
controller, respectively, to provide such information at the time
of processing or to the date subject if the data was not ob-
tained directly from him or her.14 Put together, this approach
seems designed to fatally damage the chances of generating
a personalised ex post “right to an explanation” from art
15(h) without severe judicial disagreement with these
guidelines15—and indeed the example given of “meaningful in-
formation” at p 14 restricts itself to regurgitating back (i) input
information provided by the data subject, (ii) relevant infor-
mation provided by others (e.g. credit history) and (iii) relevant
public information used in the decision (e.g. public records of
fraud). In other words, A29WP has suggested that no informa-
tion about the “innards” of the decision-making process—
anything of a decompositional nature16—need be given. Another
gap would be any information about how the training set was
established, chosen, cleaned or so on. At this stage in the evo-
lution of practice relating to algorithmic transparency, ignoring
the training set is arguably both an overly restrictive and pre-
scriptive approach.
Interestingly, in a different part of the document, namely,
the “Good practice recommendations”, the A29 WP still sug-
gests that while “a complex mathematical explanation about
how algorithms or machine-learning work” will generally not
be relevant, it “should also be provided if this is necessary to
allow experts to further verify how the decision-making process
works”.17 At what point and how this optional provision of in-
formation becomes “necessary” is, unfortunately, not further
pursued by the Working Party.
3. Implications for Article 22 definitions
Firstly, the A29WP comes down strongly in favour of Article 22
being read as a general prohibition rather than a right to
opt-out.18 The ambiguous language of this oddly worded pro-
vision has long been a subject of confusion,19 with countries
such as the UK opting to interpret the DPD as requiring notice
in writing to trigger this ‘right’.20 Given that the language of
the core provision is in essence unchanged, this could be seen
as unauthorised law-making. It is worth noting however that
this trend is not confined to the A29WP alone, as both the
similar provision to the GDPR’s Article 22 in the Law Enforce-
ment Directive,21 the data protection regime applicable to the
police, and the UK’s transposition of it in its draft Data Pro-
tection Bill,22 also changes the provision from a right to a
prohibition.
Whether a right or a prohibition, Article 22 is restricted in
two ways: to 1) “solely” automated decisions; which 2) produce
“legal” or “similarly significant” effects. Both of these con-
cepts contain substantial ambiguity where guidance is welcome
and the A29 WP provide this at pp 9–11.
3.1. “Solely”
In art 22, the definition of “solely” is crucial to the practical
extent of the rights afforded to data subjects.23 Many auto-
mated systems produce significant outputs about individuals
e.g. relating to criminal bail, welfare benefits or potential for
employment, but few do so without what is often described
as a “human in the loop”—in other words they act as deci-
sion support systems, rather than autonomously making
decisions. Indeed it is quite hard to think of many auto-
mated systems where significant decisions are made “solely”
by algorithms—behavioural targeting of adverts being one pos-
sible example (though see below regarding whether such a use
is “significant”), while financial products, which already exist
within a highly regulated domain, are also commonly wheeled
out as illustration. Yet if any human involvement at all is
allowed, through literal interpretation, to exclude a system from
the ambit of Article 22, then its reach will be small indeed.
Worse still, it would be easy to introduce a nominal human
into the loop, “rubber stamping” automated decisions in order
to knock out art 22 rights. In fact there is some evidence that
even where systems are explicitly intended only to support a
human decision maker, for reasons of trust in automated logic,
lack of time, convenience or whatever, then the system tends
to de facto operate as wholly automated.24 There is a strong
argument therefore that rights to control “solely” automated
decision making must also apply to decisions made with some
degree of human involvement, though the extent of that degree
is hard to set.
The A29WP provides two interesting statements here. Firstly,
they note that “if someone routinely applies automatically gen-
erated profiles to individuals without any influence on the
result, this would still be a decision based solely on auto-
mated processing”. This implies that when considering if
“solely” applies to an automated system, DPAs should con-
sider how often the system operator disagree with the system
outputs and changes or otherwise augments them. Looking
forward, this would have interesting consequences. If the
machine is claimed to outperform humans and treated as such,
any human’s involvement in the process designed to avoid the
application of Article 22 this should necessarily be expected
13 Ibid., 14.
14 Ibid., 15.
15 See eg Selbst and Powles op. cit.
16 Edwards and Veale (n 4).
17 Ibid., 29.
18 A29WP (n 9), 9.
19 See eg Bygrave op. cit.
20 Data Protection Act 1998, s 12(1).
21 Regulation (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authori-
ties for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal pen-
alties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ 2016 L 119/89, art 11(1).
22 Data Protection HL Bill (2017–18) (66), cl 47.
23 Ibid., Bygrave op. cit.; Wachter and others op. cit.
24 Linda J Skitka and others, ‘Accountability and automation bias’
(2000) 52 International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 4, 701.
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to be effectively nominal. This would mean the system should
be regarded as “solely” automated, and where the signifi-
cance criterion is also met, will require a human system to exist
in parallel.
The A29WP also adds that “meaningful human input” is re-
quired rather than a “token gesture” for the system to be
categorised as not “solely” automated. This second perspec-
tive focusses on ensuring the human has, in the words of the
Working Party, the “authority and competence” to change the
decision.This forms an interesting challenge. It has been noted
that where humans are involved in decision-making, they are
often in “moral crumple zones”, socially and culturally respon-
sible for the errors of complex systems even where upon careful
analysis blame is much harder to assign.25 As and if machine
systems become better at given tasks, we can expect main-
taining non-token “authority and competence” to be a
significant social and organisational challenge, further reduc-
ing the scope of avoiding Article 22 obligations.
Given these quite tricky sociotechnical issues, how will
“solely” be assessed? A Data Protection Impact Assessment
(DPIA) seems the obvious choice, yet Annex 2 of the recent
A29WP DPIA guidance providing “Criteria for an acceptable
DPIA” omits any mention of Article 22 rights and obligations,
potentially creating confusion on the ground.26 How this ex-
panded notion of “solely” could practically be assessed from
the point of view of the data controller or the data subject is
one of the significant grey areas this guidance leaves in its wake.
3.2. “Legal” or “similarly [significant]” effects
The second main restraint on user rights over automated
decision-making and profiling is whether a decision has legal
effects or if not or, alternately, is “significant”. While legal effects
are fairly clearly restricted to cases where legal status is altered
or legal duties created (e.g. assessment of immigration status;
authentication of a legal contract) “significant” effects are much
vaguer.
The A29WP suggests that “significant” decisions include
those the potential to “significantly influence the circum-
stances, behaviour or choices of the individuals concerned”,
as well as those that may lead to individuals’ “exclusion or
discrimination”.27 The use of “influence” not just “cause” in-
terestingly suggests that systems that “nudge” individuals e.g.
by changing the way that the choices they have available are
presented may fall within these provisions, even if the final
decision is left at least ostensibly to the individual—a discus-
sion familiar to those following the literature on profiling and
the law.28
Connectedly, systems generating differential pricing ac-
cording to the profiled characteristics of a data subject (“price
discrimination”29) would also be considered significant “if, for
example, prohibitively high prices effectively bar someone from
certain goods or services”.30 Interestingly, according to the
A29WP, significant effects can be positive or negative.This does
not explicitly depart from the 1995 Directive, but interest-
ingly it does depart from early drafts which only restricted
decisions “adversely” affecting individuals.31
A key issue on which views have differed since the 1995 Di-
rective is automated targeting of adverts can ever be
“significant”.32 On the one hand this is one of the most ubiq-
uitous experiences of “solely” automated decision-making and
the mismatch of targeted adverts with user expectations is a
prime source of distrust of profiling in general.33 On the other
hand, adverts are not commands—it is arguable they are not
even “decisions”—and can be easily ignored or blocked, even
though they may shape individual experiences over time. The
A29WP takes a middle line, suggesting that adverts targeted
on simple demographics such as gender, age or city, do not have
a “significant effect” on the recipient but that some adverts may,
depending on:
• the intrusiveness of the profiling process;
• the expectations and wishes of the individuals concerned;
• the way the advert is delivered; or
• the particular vulnerabilities of the data subjects targeted.
These are mostly sensible, obvious factors to pick out—
there is strong consensus, to pick two examples, that targeting
anorexics with emetics, or profiling using recorded over-
heard conversations rather than disclosed text are unsavoury
practices—but do these matters make the decision more sig-
nificant or just more unpleasant? In the former case, perhaps
yes—but what about the latter? There is a danger here that the
A29WP guidance, well-meaningly, is drawing more from con-
sumer protection principles than the underlying text.34 On the
other hand, it is odd to see no mention of the theory that tar-
geted adverts are significant because, like price discrimination
mentioned immediately below, they reduce the universe of
25 Madeline Claire Elish, ‘Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales
in Human-Robot Interaction’ (2016) We Robot 2016 Working Papers,
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2757236.
26 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely
to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679’
(WP 248 rev.01, 4 October 2017), 22.
27 A29WP (n 9), 10,
28 See generally Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s)
of Law (2015, Edward Elgar).
29 See Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and Joost Poort, ‘Online Price
Discrimination and EU Data Privacy Law’ (2017) 40 Journal of Con-
sumer Policy 3, 347–366.
30 The Working Party do not consider as some scholars have that
a higher price could be an “invitation to enter an agreement”, and
thus have potential legal effect. See ibid., 362.
31 Bygrave op. cit.
32 Isak Mendoza and Lee A Bygrave, ‘The Right not to be Subject
to Automated Decisions based on Profiling’ in Tatiana Synodinou
and others (eds.) EU Internet Law: Regulation and Enforcement (Springer,
2017).
33 For example, refer to the persistent speculation that FB “listen”
to mobile users through their smartphone microphone and uses
this to send ads related to conversations; FB denies this and it indeed
seems unlikely it is necessary given the volume of other data and
metadata they can draw on. See Zoe Kleinman, ‘Facebook denies
“listening” to conversations’ BBC News (28 October 2017)
<http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41776215> accessed 14 No-
vember 2017.
34 cf Natali Helberger, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and Agustin
Reyna, ‘The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at The Relationship
Between EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law’ (2017) 54
Common Market Law Review 1427.
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those deemed not suitable, not rich or not persuadable enough
by certain offers and this create social sorting.
The issue of the significance of adverts dovetails into the
overarching question of whether the effects must be “signifi-
cant” to individuals, or if it suffices that they are significant
to a group of which the data subject is a member.35 For example,
an advert targeted to those with “black-sounding” first names,
suggesting that the aid of a criminal defence lawyer may be
needed, does little to harm the reputation of the particular black,
Harvard security professor, Latanya Sweeney, that was inves-
tigating the phenomenon when it occurred to her, but may
arguably create a penumbra of racial bias and expectations of
illegal behaviour around the entire group of black people, some
of whom will be more vulnerable than our professor subject.36
Alternately it could be argued that this is to confuse cause and
effect; the group profile gave rise to the targeted advert which
failed to significantly affect the professor. At root here is an
irreconcilable tension between DP as a creature of the indi-
vidual rights paradigm, and the inevitable conclusion that
algorithmic decision-making leads to group harms. As above
there is a choice to be made here between addressing social
harms and letting equality law leak into DP law, or maintain-
ing a more conservative separation.
The A29WP gives confusing signals in this respect. On one
hand, they highlight that “[p]rocessing that might have little
impact on individuals may in fact have a significant effect on
certain groups of society, such as minority groups or vulner-
able adults”. Yet the example they then cite, of the vulnerable
person in financial difficulties who is targeted with invites to
online gambling, re-individualises the problem again to a person
rather than a group (p 11): someone’s identity as a gambling
addict is defined primarily by their gambling behaviour, which
is a quite different notion from someone whose group is defined
by membership of a minority, and potentially protected, class
– and thus the relation of protected characteristics to “signifi-
cant” decisions remains unclear.
A paragraph or so later, however, we find the suggestion that
the characteristics of the group may lead to detrimental al-
gorithmic decisions about an individual data subject, in that
significant effects “may also be triggered by the actions of in-
dividuals other than the one to which the automated decision
relates” [italics added]. An example is given of where postcodes
for down-at-heel areas might contribute to poor credit scoring
for an otherwise creditworthy individual who lives there.There
is no reason why such decisions should not fall within art 22—it
is the decision that concerns the data subject that triggers it,
even if the data used to make the decision comes partly or
wholly from elsewhere. In fact such “peer related” factors are
the norm rather than the exception in machine learning. And
these are clearly the cases where transparency and associ-
ated opportunities for challenge under art 22 would be of the
greatest use. In equality law proper, whether this use of group
data to inform personalised decisions is “fair” is a conun-
drum which has been grappled with not always to produce
optimum results, as with the famous decision of the CJEU37 to
proscribe discrimination in insurance results on the grounds
of gender, which was expected to raise premiums for both sexes,
but has been accused of further widening the gap between male
and female quotes through the use of proxies.38
3.3. Suitable safeguards
3.3.1. Updates on the “right to an explanation”
The alleged “right to an explanation” safeguard in Article 22
has, as already noted, been the subject of both significant hope
and contention, the latter particularly surrounding its legally
ambiguous status39 and its technical dimensions and practi-
cal use (or inherent limits) as a remedy.40 Many of the issues
relate to the inclusion of the right in the recitals of the GDPR,
written in mandatory language, but its exclusion from the main
article for political reasons, where a similar, shorter list of safe-
guards is provided.41 The A29WP, clearly suffering themselves
from this contradiction, does not address it head on, and there-
fore only compound the confusion it generates. In one page,
they even manage to provide an Article 22-based safeguard list
(omitting a right to an explanation) with the contradictory
Recital 71-based list (including a right to an explanation)
footnoted.42 Furthermore, they emphasise that the Recital 71
safeguards apply “in any case” [italics in original].43 They go on,
in their “Key GDPR provisions that reference automated
decision-making as defined in Article 22” section to choose the
Recital 71 list and omit the Article 22 list,44 whilst in the page
preceding of “good practice” suggestions for suitable safe-
guards the right is conspicuous only by its absence, even in
the presence of without explicit basis in recitals at all, such
as “ethical review boards to assess the potential harms and
benefits to society”!45
The second set of issues, concerning the practical types of
information that can be delivered by means of any Article 22-
based explanation, are not addressed at all in the text. All
references elaborating on algorithmic explanations relate to
Section 2 information provisions rather than Article 22 safe-
guards, which as noted above, have a more general purview.
Whether such a right to an explanation, were it to exist might
include the kinds of “subject-centred” explanations (such as
decision sensitivity to changes in input variables46), and how
this right might play with the range of explanation facilities,
both static and interactive, being pushed by computer
35 Edwards and Veale (n 4).
36 Latanya Sweeney, ‘Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery’ (2013)
56 Communications of the ACM 5, 44–54; ibid.
37 Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consummateurs Test-
Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil des ministres [2011] ECR I-00773.
38 Patrick Collinson, ‘How an EU gender equality ruling widened
inequality’ The Guardian (London, 14 January 2017) <https://
www.theguardian.com/money/blog/2017/jan/14/eu-gender-ruling-
car-insurance-inequality-worse> accessed 14 November 2017. The
use of proxy variables is well-studied in relation to fairness in al-
gorithmically made and supported decisions. See eg Barocas and
Selbst (n 5).
39 Wachter and others op. cit.
40 Edwards and Veale (n 4).
41 Wachter and others op. cit.




46 For a broader typology, see Edwards and Veale (n 4).
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scientists in conferences and workshops such as Fairness Ac-
countability and Transparency in Machine Learning (FATML)
is yet to be seen.
3.3.2. Children
The A29WP was faced with an unenviable task in relation to
automated decision-making and children: reconciling an ab-
solute ban in the recitals with silence in the main text. Recital
71 states bluntly that the types of decisions in Article 22(1)
“should not concern a child”. Article 22, however, does not
mention children. The Working Party’s decided that it there-
fore “does not consider that this represents an absolute
prohibition on this type of processing in relation to children”
but that “wherever possible” controllers should not rely on
Article 22(2) exemptions to justify it. This is in line with the
interpretation of Mendoza and Bygrave,47 who suggest that this
will “likely increase the stringency” of the measures in Article
22, such as which decisions are construed as significant. The
A29WP add to this to note that where this decision-making
may need to be carried out (e.g. to “protect [children’s] welfare”)
this must be alongside safeguards “appropriate for children”.
The trade-off made in this draft guidance, being value-charged
as discussions around children’s rights often are, has already
led to heated debate in at least national legislature.48
3.3.3. Discrimination-aware profiling, including machine
learning
The GDPR is quiet, although not silent, on bias and discrimi-
nation within algorithmic systems. The most direct allusion
to it is found in a very long, winding sentence in Recital 71,49
which notes the controller should “implement technical and
organisational measures [. . .] in a manner [. . .] that pre-
vents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons” on
the basis of special categories50 of data.This can be read in light
of “discrimination aware” or “fairness aware: data mining and
machine learning, a growing field of research and practice.51
While “fairness” is an overarching principle of the GDPR, it is
an extremely under-determined notion in data protection that
has never been substantially attached to non-discrimination
in processing outcomes.52
There are three main areas where the A29WP expresses
views on discrimination and bias in machine learning systems
used in profiling and automated decision-making.
First, they suggest measures to tackle discrimination as au-
tomated decision-making safeguards under Article 22(3–4).
Following the allusion to discrimination-aware data mining in
Recital 71, they recommend data controllers “design ways to
address any prejudicial elements”, “audit algorithms”, and un-
dertake “regular” and “cyclical” reviews to avoid discrimination
on the basis of special category data.The enforceability of these
will depend on whether the safeguards listed in Art 22 (only
“the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the con-
troller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the
decision”), which are required “at least”, are seen as mini-
mally “suitable”, or whether the balancing of safeguards against
subjects’ rights and freedoms will oblige further action.
Second, they suggest that data controllers relying on the
legitimate interests grounds to justify profiling must particu-
larly consider safeguards concerning “fairness, non-
discrimination and accuracy”.53 Legitimate interest can never
serve as grounds for the automated decisions considered in
Article 22(1) so this can only apply to profiling where process-
ing is not completely automated. It is unclear whether the
“fairness” discussed in this section is linked in any way to the
“fairness” principle in Article 5(1)(a) though this would seem
a natural assumption.54 A29WP nevertheless advises, albeit
within an illustrative example, that within the information and
access rights of arts 13–15, discussed earlier, controller should
consider providing data subjects with information that their
profiling methods “are regularly tested to ensure they remain
fair, effective and unbiased”.55
Thirdly, they refer to the obligations of data controllers who
infer special categories of data from “ordinary” personal data
through the use of profiling. This is a fraught area given in-
creasing evidence that it is easy to derive from quotidian data
such as social media posts and shopping bills, sensitive data
about e.g. health and political opinions.56 The A29WP argues
this places a duty on such a data controller to notify data sub-
jects not just that they have collected the data but that such
sensitive inferences have been made (p 22). This has interest-
ing logical consequences for the whole topic of discrimination
aware ML. Seen at its most restrictive, it might imply that when-
ever a data controller can reasonably foresee they may “create”
special categories of data i.e. in any case where non-sensitive
personal data becomes a proxy for a special category of per-
sonal data in a model, such processing will have to take place
47 Mendoza and Bygrave op. cit.
48 HL Deb 13 November 2017, volume 785, cols 1865, 1870.
49 Recital 71, GDPR notes that “the controller should use appro-
priate mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling,
implement technical and organisational measures [. . .] that pre-
vents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the
basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs,
trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual ori-
entation, or that result in measures having such an effect”.
50 What constitutes “special categories of personal data” in the
GDPR is defined in Article 9(1). “Processing of personal data re-
vealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the pro-
cessing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data con-
cerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited”.
51 Dino Pedreshi, Salvatore Ruggieri and Franco Turini,
‘Discrimination-aware data mining’ (2008) Proceedings of the 14th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining (KDD’08); more recently, see the proceedings of
the four (as of 2017) Workshops on Fairness, Accountability and
Transparency in Machine Learning (FAT/ML) at www.fatml.org.
52 See Damian Clifford and Jef Ausloos, ‘Data protection and the
role of fairness’ (3 August 2017) CiTiP Working Paper Series 29/
2017.
53 A29WP (n 9), 21.
54 Clifford and Ausloos op. cit.
55 A29WP (n 9), 14.
56 See eg Svitlana Volkova and Yoram Bachrach, ‘On predicting so-
ciodemographic traits and emotions from communications in social
networks and their implications to online self-disclosure.’ (2015)
18 Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 12 (2015) 726–
736.
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under the restricted grounds for processing of Article 9. This
would, in most commercial cases, exclude the use of legiti-
mate interests and require explicit consent to the creation of
the sensitive data. In particular, it would place a particular im-
perative on data controllers to undertake prior analysis of the
fairness characteristics57 of their systems during the training
period to observe if such proxy effects occur and if so, either
to amend them or to seek new consents from the data sub-
jects. This would be somewhat radical and provoke a refined
emphasis on DP impact assessments which are also
emphasised in the guidance.
4. Conclusion
This weighty guidance, despite some careful ambiguities in
wording, leans at times nearer to unauthorised law-making than
mere interpretation. This is particularly evident in the sec-
tions on what “solely”, and “significant effects” mean in the
context of art 22, as well as in the attitude taken to art 15 and
its interaction with the “right to an explanation”. On the other
hand, little tangible help is given in relation to whether that
elusive right can be derived from art 22 or recital 71, and
(perhaps unsurprisingly) no help is given at all on what kind
of elements might go into such explanations. A29WP might have
referred the reader helpfully to the 2016 French Digital Re-
public Act58 which gives quite detailed instructions on what
information should be provided by way of explanation of
algorithmic decisions in the administrative public sector, a
model which has also been suggested as an amendment to the
UK’s Data Protection Bill in the course of its House of Lords
process.59 Another failure, albeit fairly understandable given
the difficulties of the text, is to address head on the issue of
whether and when profiling of children is allowed. Finally, there
are interesting future hooks for regulators and (probably) na-
tional courts in relation to algorithmic bias and discrimination.
The rules for inferred special categories of data are likely only
to become ever more controversial as the deployment of po-
litical, racial and economic modelling of data subjects through
casual online exchanges, clicks and “Likes” becomes more
apparent.60 Indeed, these rules, which were perhaps unex-
pected in their conviction and especially pertinent when
considering the nature of data transformation in modelling,
could end up very important indeed for future governance of
profiling in Europe.
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